Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self-referentiality, philosophy: A) self-reference is the description of an action or statement of a thinking subject, which is about this subject. B) is the nature of a linguistic expression (word or sentence) which, by its application, should apply to this expression. See also circularity, external/internal, reference system, paradoxes, heterology, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Logic Texts on Self- Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
Sainsbury V 181f Self-referentiality/circular reasoning/paradox/Sainsbury: you can construct the liar paradoxes without self-reference: V 182 (A) (said by a on Monday) All of what b will say on Tuesday, is true. (B) (said by b on Tuesday) Nothing of what a said on Monday is true. Circularity: contains no reference, but rather a quantification and therefore no self-reference. - Circularity: No properties of sentences themselves: e.g. (C) (Said by g (instead of b) said on Tuesday) Nothing of what a said on Monday is true. Since (C) and (B) are the same sentence, it can not be the meaning, which is prevented by circularity. Solution: indexicality? >Circular reasoning. Distinction sentence/statement (use on occasion, utterance). >Sentence, >Statement, >Utterance, >Situation, >Use._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Logic Texts
> Counter arguments in relation to Self- Reference
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28